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I. Introduction
Melinda Crandall was stopped at a freeway metering light
when she was rear-ended by a teenage driver. 1 At forty-five, Mrs.
1.

Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion Re: Expert Witness Testimony of Wilson C.
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Crandall was a recovering quadriplegic with two cervical fusions
from prior injuries. 2 Mrs. Crandall was in immediate distress,
and paramedics rushed her to a hospital. 3 Beginning the day of
the accident, Mrs. Crandall complained of new pain in her head
and neck that made her nauseous and caused severe and
frequent vomiting. 4 Approximately ten months after the accident,
a tear in Mrs. Crandall’s carotid artery led to a stroke, which
caused permanent cognitive deficits. 5
Mrs. Crandall’s automobile insurer hired a neurologist, Dr.
Alan Goldman, to decide whether the tear in the artery could
have been caused by the collision. 6 Dr. Goldman reported that the
accident had worsened Mrs. Crandall’s head and neck pain,
which had caused vomiting, which in turn probably caused the
artery to tear. 7 Dr. Goldman attributed 60% of Mrs. Crandall’s
headaches to the rear-end accident and 40% to preexisting
injuries. 8 Based on that report and similar opinions from Mrs.
Crandall’s treating doctors, the Crandalls submitted a claim for
medical expenses under their auto insurance policy. 9 The insurer
denied their claim. 10
Melinda filed a lawsuit. In response, her insurance company
hired experts, including a biomechanical engineer, Wilson C.
Hayes, Ph.D. 11 Dr. Hayes used accident reconstruction
Hayes, Ph.D. and Incorporated Memorandum in Support at 2, Crandall v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11-CV-00497 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 2013), 2013 WL 9850959
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion]. The speed of the teenager’s vehicle was
later estimated to be five miles per hour or less. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV-497-RJS, 2013 WL
5819283, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2013).
6. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at 2–3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Crandall, 2013 WL 5819283, at *1. The Crandall’s American Family
auto insurance policy promised $100,000 for medical expenses, with an
additional $1,000,000 available in an umbrella policy. At the time the Crandalls
submitted the claim, a life care planner had estimated that Mrs. Crandall’s
medical expenses would exceed $2,000,000. Id.
10. Id.
11. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xv–xix.
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techniques and computer software to simulate forces in the
accident. 12 Dr. Hayes concluded that the collision was incapable
of causing either the arterial injury or any aggravation of prior
injuries because the forces were comparable to “activities of daily
living,” such as skipping rope, running and abruptly stopping,
and hopping. 13 Melinda moved to exclude Dr. Hayes’s opinions
under Daubert. 14 The federal district court judge allowed some of
Dr. Hayes’s opinions, but excluded any opinions regarding
whether or not the accident was the cause of Mrs. Crandall’s
injuries. Referring to the sparse case law applying Daubert to
biomechanical engineers’ testimony, the judge observed that
“there are cases all over the map on this issue.” 15
Biomechanical engineers’ entry into personal injury litigation
has sparked debate about scientists’ role in personal injury
litigation. 16 Medical experts have a longstanding monopoly on
injury causation testimony, but some now argue that
biomechanical engineers are even more qualified to determine the
cause of traumatic injuries. 17 Biomechanical experts use
12. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion Re: Expert
Witness Testimony of Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D. and Incorporated Memorandum
in Support, Exhibit C at 2, 19, Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11-CV00497 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion]. Dr. Hayes’s testimony regarding the force necessary
to cause arterial injury contradicted the testimony of a neurologist,
neurosurgeon, and a neuro-interventional surgeon. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert
Motion, supra note 1, at xv–xix (quoting five medical experts as testifying that
minor, trivial trauma can cause carotid artery dissection).
13. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note
12, Exhibit C at 2, 19. There are many cases like Crandall v. American Family
Mutual Insurance. Auto insurers have been hiring biomechanical experts with
increasing frequency after denying a claim. See, e.g., Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32,
34 (Del. 2004) (setting out nearly identical facts and proffered expert testimony);
Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1226–27 (Del. 2004) (same); see also See Donna
L. Burden et al., Biomechanical Engineering Testimony: Legitimate Expert
Analysis or Junk Science?, 47 DRI DEF. 21, 21 (2005) (“Today, biomechanical
engineers are being used in a variety of cases to address the forces involved in
an accident (especially low-impact cases) and to determine whether the accident
could have caused a plaintiff’s injuries.”).
14. Transcript of Record at 10, Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11CV-00497 (D. Utah May 30, 2014), ECF No. 129.
15. Id.
16. See id. (collecting arguments made in courts regarding the
qualifications of biomechanical engineers).
17. See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra
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computer simulations and physics in a “high technology approach
to causation” that may appear more credible than “the more
traditional but low-technology clinical approach.” 18 Trial courts
applying Daubert to biomechanical experts’ qualifications and
methodologies have reached contradictory results, often providing
little explanation for their decisions. 19
This Note applies the Daubert standard to typical
biomechanical engineer qualifications and methodologies. This
Note argues that biomechanical expert testimony regarding
injury causation should be limited due to engineers’ inability to
adapt generic data to individual plaintiffs. Part II gives a brief
explanation of biomechanical engineering. Part III provides an
overview of the law governing the admission of expert testimony.
Part IV applies Daubert’s qualifications prong and argues that
biomechanical engineers who lack medical expertise should only
be allowed to make general statements about injury causation.
Part V applies Daubert’s reliability prong to typical forensic
biomechanical methodologies and argues that extrapolation from
population-based studies is not a reliable basis for specific
causation opinions. Part V also argues that some opinions
regarding general aspects of injury causation may be
inadmissible due to the limitations of biomechanical research.
Part VI applies Daubert’s relevance and helpfulness prong and
argues that general causation opinions are not always relevant,
note 12, Exhibit 1 at 9 (quoting a prominent biomechanical expert’s affidavit
that “[i]n most instances it is the biomechanical expert rather than the medical
practitioner who is most qualified, on the basis of education, training and
experience, to express opinions on issues of injury causation”); Layssard v.
United States, No. 06-0352, 2007 WL 4144936, at *7–8 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007)
(“In essence, [the biomechanical engineer] . . . refuses to defer to the opinion of a
medical doctor because the medical doctor presumably does not have his own
engineering knowledge.”); David L. Gushue et al., Low Speed Impacts: Effective
Use of Biomedical Engineers, 53 DRI DEF. 18, 18 (arguing that medical doctors
“lack information, expertise, and a sufficient technical basis to evaluate the
nature of the collision environment which is necessary to provide an opinion
regarding injury causation”).
18. Michael D. Freeman & Sean S. Kohles, An Evaluation of Applied
Biomechanics as an Adjunct to Systematic Specific Causation in Forensic
Medicine, 161 WIEN MED WOCHENSCHR 458, 458 (2011) [hereinafter Freeman &
Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics].
19. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (describing contradictory
outcomes).
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especially when the plaintiff’s body is unlike those of test subjects
in the biomechanical literature. Part VII offers a summary and
proposes a roadmap for applying the Daubert standard to
biomechanical expert opinions in personal injury cases.
II. Background
Biomechanics exists at the crossroads of engineering and
biology, 20 focusing on how mechanical energy affects human
tissue. 21 Biomechanical engineering is a branch of biomedical
engineering, which falls within the broader field of
bioengineering. 22 Biomechanical research has contributed to
our
understanding
of
motor
vehicle
and
aircraft
crashworthiness, 23 childbirth, 24 slip-and-fall accidents, 25 child
20. See Robert M. Arthur, “Bioengineering,” a Definition, 14 BIOSCIENCE 29,
29 (1964) (“Bioengineering is presently being practiced by engineers who have
taken an interest in biology . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., Garner v. Baird, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762, 762 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010)
(defining biomechanics as “the application of physics and mechanical engineering
to the human body”); Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics,
supra note 18, at 458 (“Biomechanics may be simply defined as the study of the
effect of mechanical energy on biological tissue.”); Y.C. Fung, Biomechanics, Its
Scope, History and Some Problems of Continuum Mechanics in Physiology, 21
APPLIED MECHANICS REV. 1, 28 (1968) (“[B]iomechanics is mechanics applied to
biology.”).
22. See Fung, supra note 21, at 29 fig.1 (listing biomechanics and
bioastronautics as part of the broader field of biomedics).
23. See id. at 399 (discussing the relationship between biomechanical
engineers and the National Highway Safety Bureau, which developed a set of
standards controlling the performance of cars in terms of their crashworthiness);
see also NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: BUS
CRASHWORTHINESS 15 (Sept. 21, 1999) (discussing the benefit of computer
simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school bus roll-over as a tool
“to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues for similar types of
accidents”); Jeffrey Augenstein & Kennerly Digges, Performance of Advanced Air
Bags Based on Data William Lehman Injury Research Center and New NASS
PSUs, 47TH ANN. PROC. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT AUTOMOTIVE MED. 1, 1–2 (2003)
(discussing methods used for gathering data from patients suffering traumatic
injuries and making connections to vehicle safety design).
24. See James A. Ashton-Miller & John O.L. DeLancey, On the Biomechanics
of Vaginal Birth and Common Sequelae, 11 ANN. REV. BIOMECHANICAL
ENGINEERING 163, 173 (2009) (discussing the biomechanics of childbirth and
developing a biomechanical model for anterior vaginal wall prolapse).
25. See Wojciech Wach & Jan Unarski, Fall From Height in a Stairwell—
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abuse, 26 athletics, 27 and even the motor development of infants
and children. 28 While a general interest in the connection
between biology and physics is nothing new, the field of
biomechanics has only received widespread recognition in recent
decades. 29
A. Biomechanics in Litigation
Outside of litigation, biomechanical research focuses in
several main areas, including: (i) how and why injuries occur in
populations; (ii) which of two or more competing injury
mechanisms was most likely to have caused an injury; and
(iii) how an injury might have been mitigated by safety
countermeasures. 30 Biomechanical analyses have been helpful as
an adjunct to medical investigations seeking to discover how an
Mechanics and Simulation Analysis, 244 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 136, 136 (2014)
(describing the body of biomechanical research regarding falls from height as
“extensive”).
26. See Mary Clyde Pierce & Gina Bertocci, Injury Biomechanics and Child
Abuse, 10 ANN. REV. BIOMECHANICAL ENGINEERING 85, 88 (2008) (discussing the
role of biomechanical research in improving the accuracy of “differentiating child
abuse from accidental trauma”).
27. See Caroline F. Finch, Shahid Ullah & Andrew S. McIntosh, Combining
Epidemiology and Biomechanics in Sports Injury Prevention Research, 41 SPORTS
MED. 59, 65 (2011) (“Aetiological approaches towards studying sports injury,
which aim to understand how and why injuries occur, need to be firmly planted
in biomechanics.”).
28. See A. J. ‘‘Knoek’’ van Soest & Annick Ledebt, Towards a Broader
Scope of Biomechanics in Developmental Studies: A Commentary on Jensen
(2005), 14 INFANT CHILD DEV. 513, 515–16 (2005) (applying biomechanical
principles to explain universal sequence in motor milestones).
29. See Murray Mackay, The Increasing Importance of the Biomechanics of
Impact Trauma, 32 SĀDHANĀ 397, 401–02 (2007) (discussing the rise of
experimental impact biomechanics in the 1980s and 1990s).
30. See Michael D. Freeman & Sean S. Kohles, Applications and
Limitations of Forensic Biomechanics: A Bayesian Perspective, 17 J. FORENSIC
LEGAL MED. 67, 67 (2009) [hereinafter Freeman & Kohles, Forensic
Biomechanics] (discussing differences between biomechanical research in the
field and litigation-related analyses); see also R. Bahr & T. Krosshaug,
Understanding Injury Mechanisms: A Key Component of Preventing Injuries in
Sport, 9 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 324, 325 (2005) (stating that proper
documentation of activities surrounding injury is a critical step in preventing
future injuries and identifying potential mechanisms of injury).
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injury occurred. 31 In addition, competent analyses of how injuries
may be prevented have been routinely admitted in product
In
personal
litigation,
however,
liability
litigation. 32
biomechanical experts often focus less on how injuries may have
occurred and more on whether injury occurred. 33
Biomechanical engineers’ first serious foray into litigation
consulting came in 1979. 34 In the decade that followed,
biomechanical engineers were predominantly hired in product
liability litigation to offer opinions about design defects and
alternative designs. 35 There were no notable court opinions
applying Daubert to a biomechanic’s injury causation opinion
until 1997, when the Sixth Circuit decided Smelser v. Norfolk
Southern Railway. 36 In Smelser, the Sixth Circuit held that a
trial court should have limited biomechanical expert opinions to
those regarding general aspects of causation. 37 The Smelser
31. See June A. Ejlersen et al., An Unusual Case of Sudden Unexpected
Death: Postmortem Investigation and Biomechanical Analysis of the Cervical
Spine, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 462, 464 (2007) (describing a biomechanical analysis
as an adjunct to a medical investigation of traumatology and cause of death).
32. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
33. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 67
(noting that the goals of forensic biomechanical analyses are different than the
goals of biomechanical analyses outside of litigation); see also Wilson C. Hayes
et al., Forensic Injury Biomechanics, 2 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 55,
58 (2007) (arguing that biomechanical engineers can adapt and revise
population-based criteria to apply to individuals).
34. See Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490, 498 (Md. App.
1979) (admitting expert biomechanical engineer testimony regarding design
safety in a defective manufacturing case involving a van rollover); see also
Crump v. Universal Safety Equip. Co., 398 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Ill. App. 1979)
(referencing biomechanical expert testimony regarding safety glasses in a
product liability case).
35. See cases cited supra note 34 (collecting cases); see also Mannino v. Int’l
Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding biomechanical expert
testimony admissible regarding an allegedly defective child’s car seat safety
strap); Pineda v. L.A. Turf Club, Inc., 169 Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting a biomechanical consultant’s trial testimony regarding an allegedly
defective helmet); Cloud v. State, 420 So. 2d 1259, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting a biomechanical expert’s opinion regarding the safety of stairs based on
slope and tread but criticizing the expert’s opinion regarding the cause of the
plaintiff’s fall); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Wis.
1984) (noting biomechanical expert testimony in a products liability case
regarding the design of a passenger seat).
36. 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997).
37. See id. at 305 (limiting biomechanical expert testimony to opinions

HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE?

1071

opinion is discussed in more detail in Part IV.B. Despite Smelser,
the practice of retaining biomechanical experts in personal injury
cases has become increasingly popular in the past twenty years. 38
III. Rules Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
This Part reviews the evolution of legal standards for expert
testimony, beginning with the previously predominant test
derived from Frye v. United States. 39 It then discusses the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of those rules in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals 40 as creating a new standard for expert
testimony. Finally, it details the three prongs of the Daubert
standard: expert qualifications, reliable methodology, and
relevance.
A. The Frye “General Acceptance” Test
Between 1923 and 1993, the standard for evaluating expert
testimony was rooted in Frye, a D.C. Circuit opinion. Under the
Frye standard, the exclusive test for admissibility was whether
an expert’s methodology was “sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.” 41 Some commentators criticized Frye as inflexible
because it excluded novel scientific evidence that might have
been reliable. 42
regarding general aspects of injury causation).
38. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 458 (noting that the use of forensic biomechanical methods to explain
injury causation has been increasing over the past twenty years).
39. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
42. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 628 (1988) (arguing that the Frye test was too incoherent
to be applied effectively by the courts); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207–08, 1223 (1980) (arguing that the Frye test was too
vague and led to inconsistent results); DAVID H. DAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 5.3.3 (2004) (noting that the Frye

1072

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2016)

In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective,
including Rule 702, which provided that “if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.” 43 The adoption of Rule 702 “did not specifically
preclude the use of the Frye standard to evaluate expert
testimony,” 44 so “the effect of Rule 702 on the Frye standard was
unclear.” 45
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Current
Standard
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert and clarified
that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the
Frye test. 46 The Court explained that under the new standard,
judges have a gatekeeping duty to assess whether expert
qualifications and methodologies meet Rule 702’s twin standards
of relevance and reliability. 47 The Court suggested factors that
would assist the judiciary in assessing the scientific validity of
proffered expert evidence, including testability, peer review, rates
of error, and general acceptance. 48 Subsequent cases and the
opinion was unclear in its standard).
43. FED. R. EVID. 702.
44. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L.
339, 340 (2002).
45. Andrew Jurs & Scott De Vito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical
Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 675, 685
(2013).
46. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)
(discussing the Frye test and stating, “That austere standard, absent from, and
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in
federal trials”).
47. See id. at 592 (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then,
the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”).
48. See infra notes 59–64 (outlining factors that have been suggested as
helpful in assessing scientific testimony).
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Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 have elaborated on and
added to these factors. 49
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has explained that “the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a
somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have
been admissible under Frye.” 50 In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 51 the Court stated that the intent of the Daubert
standard was to ensure that any expert “employ[] in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” 52 While a majority
of states have adopted standards that are similar or identical to
the federal Daubert standard, more than a dozen states and the
District of Columbia continue to apply the Frye test, and a
handful of states have developed different evidentiary
standards. 53 This Note applies only the Daubert standard.
1. Expert Qualifications
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that an expert be
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.” 54 This standard has been characterized as a “liberal
one” but still requires “that the area of the witness’s competence
match the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.” 55

49. See infra notes 59–64 (same).
50. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
51. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
52. Id. at 152.
53. See generally Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90
A.L.R.5th 453 (2014) (comparing states’ evidentiary standards for expert
testimony).
54. FED. R. EVID. 702.
55. Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (M.D. Ga. 2007)
(citations omitted).
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Rule 702 requires that experts testify based on “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge.” 56 The Court in
Daubert interpreted this to mean that the methods underlying an
expert’s opinions must be reliable. 57 To be reliable, the expert’s
reasoning or methodology must be “scientifically valid” and
capable of being “properly applied to the facts in issue.” 58 The
assessment of reliability is a flexible one, with many potentially
relevant considerations. 59 The Court in Daubert and its progeny
identified some non-exclusive factors, including whether a theory
or technique “can be (and has been) tested;” 60 “whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;” 61
“[w]hether . . . there is a high ‘known or potential rate of error’
and whether there are ‘standards controlling the technique’s
operation.’” 62 “General acceptance” can also have a bearing on the
inquiry. 63 The Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 702 add five
additional considerations:
(1) Whether the expert is proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research he has
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether he has
developed his opinion expressly for purposes of testifying;
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; (3) Whether the
expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative
explanations; (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he
would be in his regular professional work outside his paid
litigation consulting; (5) Whether the field of expertise claimed

56. FED. R. EVID. 702.
57. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“In
short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific
knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”).
58. Id. at 592–93.
59. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94).
63. See id. (explaining the Daubert factors).
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by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of
opinion the expert would give. 64

Forensic biomechanical analyses may not always fit nicely
within the Daubert framework because “the case-specific nature
of the inquiry makes it rarely publication worthy, subject to error
rate calculations, or even testable in practice.” 65 However, courts
should still consider whether a biomechanical engineer’s
methodology is testable, whether its use raises error rate
concerns (such as construct validity, external validity, internal
validity), 66 and whether “there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” 67 Where expert
testimony depends on a chain of inferences or interlinked
methodologies, “[a]ny step that renders the analysis
unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This
is true whether the step completely changes a reliable
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.” 68
3. Relevance
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony
“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue.” 69 Expert testimony must be “sufficiently tied to
the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual
dispute.” 70 In a personal injury case, the causation dispute is “the
64. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note (2000
amends.)).
65. Cf. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 44:9 (2013–2014) (discussing the
application of Daubert to accident reconstruction techniques); see also John B.
Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges
Use Error Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063, 1080
(2014) (“[A]pplicable error rates are not available in many disciplines.”).
66. See id. at 1067 (stating that where numerical error rates are
unavailable, “the judge must examine the methodology for flaws that are likely
to produce errors”).
67. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
68. Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 346 F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc. 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999)).
69. FED. R. EVID. 702.
70. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985); see
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for
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degree to which [a] particular plaintiff[] [was] injured in this
particular automobile accident.” 71 Finally, otherwise relevant
opinions may still be excluded if they are “substantially
outweighed” by unfair prejudice or a risk of misleading the jury
or confusing the issues. 72
IV. Biomechanical Expert Qualifications
This Part applies the first prong of the Daubert standard to
typical biomechanical expert qualifications. First, it discusses
education,
training,
and
experience
common
among
biomechanical engineers. Next, it notes similarities between the
field of biomechanics and the field of toxicology and discusses an
emerging distinction between general and specific causation in
personal injury litigation. It then discusses two notable cases,
Smelser 73 and Eskin v. Carden, 74 to illustrate different
approaches courts have taken to assess the scope of
biomechanical expert qualifications. Finally, it argues that the
Smelser approach―requiring medical expertise for specific injury
causation opinions―is the most appropriate rule.
A. Typical Education, Experience, Skill, and Training
Witnesses claiming biomechanical expertise have diverse
backgrounds. Many have an advanced degree in physiology,
mathematics, physics, or mechanical engineering. 75 Less common
one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”);
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (“Expert
testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and,
ergo, non-helpful.” (quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE, § 702[02] (1991))).
71. Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. App. 2012).
72. FED. R. EVID. 403.
73. 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997).
74. 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004).
75. See, e.g., id. at 1375 (noting degrees in physiology, mathematics, and
chemistry); Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *4–5
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (“Dr. Fijan is a mechanical engineer specializing in
biomechanics. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in mechanical engineering from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.S.E. in engineering science from
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are degrees in areas such as physical education. 76 Some who
claim to be qualified as biomechanical engineers took anatomy or
physiology classes with first-year medical students. 77
Some who claim biomechanical expertise teach courses such
as engineering, physiology, anatomy, or exercise science. 78 Others
are employed as consultants with experience in workplace
ergonomics, occupational injury prevention, or vehicle and
aircraft crashworthiness. 79 Some have conducted crash tests,
vehicle sled tests, occupant kinematics analyses, or are involved
in research on injury mechanics and human injury tolerance. 80
While some schools, including Stanford University, offer a
biomechanical engineering program, most schools do not. 81
the University of Florida.”); Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007
WL 1576708, at *27 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (“These accomplishments are
many as far as the study of physiology, health, and ‘exercise science’ are
concerned.”).
76. See Wilcox, 2007 WL 1576708, at *22 (discussing the qualifications of
David Nieman, Ph.D.).
77. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Boler, 890 N.E.2d 1174, 1182 (2008) (discussing the
education of Michele Grimm, Ph.D.). In addition to attending courses at medical
schools, some biomechanical engineers teach classes at medical schools in areas
typically limited to anatomy or physiology. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537
F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (noting that John Trimble, Ph.D., a
biomechanical engineer, taught courses in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
at a medical school).
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the education and
experience of biomechanical engineers).
79. See, e.g., Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (noting the practical experience of Robert S. Fijan,
Ph.D.); Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2014 WL
5038142, at *34 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) (noting that William Muzzy, a
biomechanical engineer had “24 years of crash injury testing experience with
human volunteers and 22 years of experience analyzing the effectiveness of
occupant restraints in automotive and aircraft crashes,” in addition to
publishing articles on human tolerance to crash forces (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
80. See cases cited supra note 62 (discussing the practical experience of
witnesses found to have expertise in the field of biomechanics).
81. See Biomechanical Engineering Major Program, STAN. U.,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/ughb/cgi-bin/handbook/index.php/Biomechanical_
Engineering_Major_Program (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (detailing the
requirements for an undergraduate degree in biomechanical engineering) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Laugelle, 2014 WL
5038142, at *10 n.85 (noting a biomechanical engineer’s testimony that a
biomechanical engineering degree “did not exist when he began his research in
1967”).
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Apparently, there is no single route to obtaining biomechanical
expertise. However, an understanding of physics, mathematics,
and engineering are helpful in order to make the calculations
necessary for accident reconstruction. 82 Qualifications in
biomedical engineering are typically necessary to perform
computer simulations. 83 Qualifications in statistics are desirable
in order to understand and apply biomechanical literature. 84 In
addition, a medical degree is required to diagnose injury. 85 For
these reasons, “[q]ualified experts in the field of . . . biomechanics
are a rare breed. This discipline requires expertise in both
mechanical engineering and in medical sciences.” 86
B. Smelser: An Emerging Distinction Between General and
Specific Causation
Many courts that have considered the scope of biomechanical
engineers’ qualifications have cited favorably to the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning in Smelser. 87 In Smelser, the United States
82. See Boykin v. W. Exp., Inc., No. 12-CV-7428, 2015 WL 539423, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (finding an expert not qualified in engineering but
admitting accident reconstruction testimony due to extensive experience
reconstructing the type of accident in question).
83. See K.S. Krishnan et al., An Injury Threshold Model For Two-Car
Collisions, 29 MGMT. SCI. 909, 910 (1983) (“The study of occupant motion . . . is
generally in the realm of biomedical science.”).
84. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 6:3 (2007) (“Individuals who specialize in
using statistical methods—and whose professional careers demonstrate this
orientation—are more likely to apply appropriate procedures and correctly
interpret the results.”).
85. See Combs v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (Va. 1998)
(“[T]he question of causation of a human injury is a component part of a
diagnosis, which in turn is part of the practice of medicine.”).
86. Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1229 n.12 (Del. 2004) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See Kelham v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-316, 2015 WL 4426027,
at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 17, 2015) (“Although not binding, this court will follow
Smelser and the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.”); Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 1208, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (adopting the reasoning in Smelser and
noting that “[o]ther courts that have considered whether a biomechanical
engineer is qualified to testify about the cause of an injury have ruled
consistently with Smelser”); Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL
2115250, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (adopting the reasoning in Smelser);
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it was an abuse of
discretion to allow a biomechanic’s testimony regarding an
injury’s precise cause because the engineer was not qualified to
consider two things that could affect injuries resulting from an
accident: First, “the different tolerance levels . . . of individuals,”
and second, the “pre-existing medical conditions of individuals.” 88
The court found the engineer’s expertise in biomechanics
qualified him only to “describe[] the forces generated in
the . . . collision, and [speak] in general about the types of injuries
those forces would generate.” 89
Smelser implies that legal causation can be separated into
two distinct sub-elements: general and specific injury causation. 90
This distinction is a settled principle in toxic tort litigation, but
before Smelser was not used in traditional personal injury
litigation. 91 General causation is concerned with whether a
substance can cause harm. 92 In toxic tort cases, general causation
refers to “epidemiological evidence indicating a consistent
statistically significant relationship between exposure and
Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (same);
Shires v. King, No. 2:05-CV-84, 2006 WL 5171770, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10,
2006) (same).
88. Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See 1 KAREN GOTTLIEB, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 15:3 (2014)
(explaining that proof of causation in toxic tort litigation requires proof of both
general and specific causation). See also generally Kerriann Laubach, Note,
Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How Epidemiological Evidence Informs Causation,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2016) (discussing the element of causation in toxic
tort cases).
92. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 23:1 (2007) (explaining the difference
between specific and general causation). The concept of general causation has
its roots in work by Sir Austin Bradford Hill, an acclaimed English scientist of
the 1900s who was a “pioneer in medical statistics and epidemiology.” Michael
Höfler, The Bradford Hill Considerations on Causality: A Counterfactual
Perspective, 2 EMERGING THEMES EPIDEMIOLOGY 11, 11 (2005). Hill became
famous for developing a list of considerations for determining “whether an
observed association involved a causal component or not,” including consistency,
specificity, temporality, biological plausibility, experiment, analogy, and others.
Id.; see also Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC. MED. 295, 295–300 (1965) (listing eight
relevant factors when considering whether an observed association is a causal
relationship).
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injury.” 93 The analog in personal injury litigation would be
population-based evidence showing a relationship between a type
of traumatic force and a type of injury. 94
Specific causation, on the other hand, is concerned with
whether a substance caused the plaintiff’s injury. 95 The
equivalent in personal injury cases is whether a traumatic
incident caused the plaintiff’s injury. 96 Translating this
distinction into personal injury terms, biomechanical experts
enter the realm of specific causation when they opine that a
trauma did or did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries. 97
C. Toxicology and Biomechanics: An Analogy
The adoption of a toxic tort causation principle may seem
odd, but comparing the fields of toxicology and biomechanics
reveals striking similarities. Toxicologists and biomechanical
engineers both seek to answer the same basic questions:
(1) “What hazards does [an exposure] present to human
populations . . . ?” and (2) “What degree of risk is associated
with . . . [an] exposure at any given dose?”98
Researchers in the two fields share many dilemmas. For
example, “it is often unethical to experiment on humans,” and
humans are only rarely exposed “in a manner that permits a
quantitative determination” of cause and effect. 99 In addition, the
data available in either field is limited in the number of “case
reports, or even experimental studies [performed] . . . under
93. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:3.
94. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1355 (M.D. Ga.
2007) (discussing whether vibration is causally linked to injury).
95. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, supra note 92, § 23:1 (explaining the difference
between specific and general causation).
96. See Burke v. TranSam Trucking, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334 (M.D.
Pa. 2009) (noting that specific causation opinions include the extent of the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff).
97. See infra notes 134–139 (collecting cases that help define the boundary
between general and specific causation opinions).
98. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 637 (listing difficulties in the science of toxicology). In toxicology,
exposures are substances, while in biomechanics exposures are types of forces.
The term “dose” in toxicology translates to a degree of force in biomechanics.
99. Id. at 636.
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circumstances
that
permit
analysis
of
dose-response
100
relationships, [or] mechanisms of action.”
Research in both
fields is also hindered by the fact that “human sensitivity . . . can
vary greatly among individuals.”101
The application of information from either field requires
“extrapolation, either across species . . . or across doses.” Finally,
both fields rely on medical examinations and diagnoses to confirm
that subjects are ill or injured. 102 These similarities may explain
why Smelser adopted the distinction between general and specific
causation. 103
D. The Smelser Rule: Medical Expertise Is Necessary to Offer
Specific Causation Opinions
Toxicologists who give specific causation testimony in court
must show that they are not only qualified to testify about
population-based research but also to take and interpret a
medical history, perform a physical examination, administer
medical tests, and to understand the “time pattern of symptoms
and disease manifestations” and the constellation of symptoms
that support or rule out causation. 104 The Smelser line of cases
100. Id. at 639.
101. Id. at 642; see also Laubach, supra note 91, at 1040–41 (discussing the
use of dose-response curves in proving causation in toxic tort cases, and stating,
“[a]lthough these curves are useful for quantifying disease risk, they can vary
for each individual, depending on genetic, epigenetic, and environmental
factors—and a combination of all three.”); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 639 (3d ed. 2011) (describing
toxicological study designs); Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 58 (proposing a
method to revise population-based biomechanical criteria to apply to
individuals).
102. See id. at 670–71 (stating that specific causation opinions regarding
toxic exposures require an “examination of the patient as well as appropriate
medical testing,” in addition to a review of medical records).
103. See, e.g., Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 726 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)
(applying the general-specific causation requirements in a toxic tort case).
104. Compare FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 667–74 (noting
that relevant individual characteristics in the context of toxic substances
include physical activity, age, sex, genetic makeup, dose, route of entry, tissue
solubility, metabolism, personal and family medical history, symptomology, and
interaction with other chemicals), with L. Uhrenholt et al., Degenerative and
Traumatic Changes in the Lower Cervical Spine Facet Joints, 37 SCAND. J.
RHEUMATOLOGY 375, 380–83 (2008) (discussing the effects of age, sex, and prior
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indicate that biomechanical experts must have similar medical
expertise before giving specific injury causation opinions. 105
One difference between toxicology and biomechanics is that
“many highly qualified toxicologists are physicians” 106 and
therefore are qualified to fill both scientific and medical roles,
while biomechanical engineers with medical degrees are rare. 107
As a general rule, biomechanical engineers lack the education
required to examine a plaintiff, take medical tests, thoroughly
review and understand medical records, including diagnostic
imaging, identify relevant symptoms, or rule out alternative
causes of those symptoms. 108 Therefore, courts adopting the
Smelser distinction between specific and general causation have

traumatic history on the lower cervical spine’s characteristics and susceptibility
to traumatic injury), and Jacqueline R. Center et al., Risk of Subsequent
Fracture After Low-Trauma Fracture in Men and Women, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
387, 393 (2007) (examining absolute as well as relative re-fracture risks in a
cohort study), and David J. Daegling et al., Structural Analysis of Human Rib
Fracture and Implications for Forensic Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1301,
1305–06 (2008) (noting the potential for large individual differences in bone
porosity and mineralization, leading to individual differences in bone
brittleness), and Caroline F. Finch et al., supra note 27, at 65 (stating that
tissue strength plays a role in injury causation and varies by age and sex, and
can increase or decrease based on training and lifestyle).
105. See Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997)
(criticizing a biomechanical engineer’s failure to examine complete medical
records and discuss symptomology with the plaintiff); Bowers v. Norfolk S.
Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (finding no evidence that a
biomechanical engineer was capable of interpreting x-rays and was not familiar
with potentially relevant medical conditions); Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222,
1231 (Del. 2004) (finding a biomechanical engineer incompetent to properly
review medical records or examine the plaintiff, and stating that no evidence
suggested “that any expert in his field would be competent, or would have taken
the opportunity to do so”); Harden v. Haven, No. 05-2009-CA-065372, 2014 Fla.
Cir. LEXIS 815, at *13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 2014) (noting that a biomechanical
expert was also “a qualified medical doctor, who can discuss specific causation
and medical issues, in addition to general causation issues at a biomechanic
level”).
106. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 675.
107. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (listing common
undergraduate and graduate degrees obtained by biomechanical engineers).
108. See cases cited supra note 105 (pointing out areas where biomechanical
engineers are unqualified); Harden, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 815, at *13
(discussing the qualifications of a biomechanical engineer who was also a
qualified medical doctor).

HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE?

1083

typically limited biomechanical engineers’ testimony to opinions
that concern injury causation in general. 109
E. Clarifying the Distinction Between General and Specific
Causation
Drawing a line between general and specific causation is not
always easy. 110 Some courts attempting to apply Smelser reach
apparently inconsistent outcomes. 111 Some variation in
interpretation is hardly surprising because the distinction
between specific and general causation in the personal injury
context is relatively new. 112
While the dividing line is not crystal clear, general causation
opinions should probably include testimony about which of
multiple competing mechanisms was more likely to cause an
injury 113 and whether population-based studies show a
109. See Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (excluding biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions); Wagoner v.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008 WL 5120750, at *2 (D. Wyo.
June 19, 2008) (excluding biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions);
Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2008) (limiting biomechanical expert testimony to general causation opinions);
Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (same).
110. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 460 (noting that specific and general causation “are inextricably
interwoven, inasmuch as specific causation depends on principles of general
causation, and general causation is based upon a foundation of individual cases
of specific causation”).
111. Compare Wagoner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008
WL 5120750, at *1 (D. Wyo. June 19, 2008) (excluding biomechanical expert
testimony that “the impact force was sufficient to cause a traumatic brain
injury”), and Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 769 (Wash. App. 2012)
(excluding testimony that “the forces generated by the impact were not
sufficient to cause the type of injuries [the plaintiff] was claiming”), with Berner
v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (allowing
biomechanical expert testimony that the “energy on [plaintiff’s] head upon
striking the floor was sufficient to have caused his mild to moderate traumatic
brain injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112. See Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 1997)
(remanding for entry of a judgment as a matter of law due to the plaintiff’s
inability to prove causation by biomechanical expert testimony alone).
113. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 458 (noting that the discipline of forensic biomechanics is best suited
to “analyzing how injuries occur and in differentiating between competing injury
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heightened risk for injury at a given level of force. 114 Specific
causation opinions, on the other hand, often take the form of a
conclusion that an injury was or was not caused by an event. 115
Examples of biomechanical expert opinions that courts have
labeled “specific” include the following:
• “It is impossible . . . to conclude that the degenerative
disease in [plaintiff’s] cervical and lumbar spines can
be attributed to the incident.” 116
• “The accident did not contribute in any significant
way to disc bulges . . . or other associated pathologies
of [plaintiff’s] . . . spine.” 117
• “[T]he ‘motion’ at issue in this case caused ‘brain
damage’ to plaintiff.” 118
• “[T]he defective shoulder belt, not the rear-end
collision, caused [plaintiff’s] back injuries and
aggravated . . . neck injuries.”119
• “The forces on her body in this accident did not result
in a concussion injury.” 120
In comparison, biomechanical expert opinions that courts
have found to be “general” include the following:
• The “energy on [plaintiff’s] head upon striking the
floor was sufficient to have caused his mild to
moderate traumatic brain injury.” 121
mechanisms for observed injuries”).
114. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 24 (stating that
population-based studies that show some increased risk may “have some
probative value . . . in proving general causation”).
115. See, e.g., Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007 WL
1576708, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (excluding opinions relating to the
cause of the plaintiff’s particular condition as specific causation opinions beyond
the expertise of the biomechanical engineer).
116. Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
118. Wagoner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008 WL
5120750, at *2 (D. Wyo. June 19, 2008).
119. Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 1997).
120. Roach v. Hughes, No. 4:13-CV-00136-JHM, 2015 WL 3970739, at *12
(W.D. Ky. June 30, 2015).
121. Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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“[T]he forces [plaintiff] generated in her . . . spine[]
during the subject accident were well below
thresholds for damage . . . as reported in the
biomechanics literature.”122
The difference between specific and general causation
opinions might seem semantic, but the distinction has significant
legal consequences. For example, if a court applies the Smelser
rule, a litigant relying solely on a biomechanical engineer to
prove or rebut causation probably will not survive summary
judgment or a motion for a directed verdict. 123
The adoption of the Smelser distinction has raised a question
about whether both general and specific causation must be
proven to make out a prima facie personal injury claim. Some
biomechanical engineers argue that general causation evidence is
always necessary and that medical doctors who lack expertise in
biomechanics are unqualified to establish general causation. 124
This may be true in some cases. For example, in Bowers v.
Norfolk Southern Corp., 125 two of the plaintiff’s medical experts
claimed that locomotive vibration caused injury to the plaintiff’s
spine. 126 In rebuttal, the defendant’s biomechanical engineer
collected biomechanical literature, estimated the amount of
vibration experienced by the plaintiff, 127 and opined that the force
was not sufficient to cause the plaintiff’s injuries. 128
Applying Daubert, the district court in Bowers found the
medical doctors’ premise that vibration could cause injury “too
vague to have any meaning for a Daubert analysis,” especially
because the plaintiff’s medical experts admitted that “not all
vibration can cause harm.” 129 The district court excluded the
•

122. Morgan, 2008 WL 2115250, at *9–10.
123. See id. (stating that the biomechanical engineer was the “only witness
whose testimony connects [plaintiff’s] injuries to the allegedly defective shoulder
belt” and finding that, absent the improper testimony, the defendant’s motion
for a directive verdict should have been granted).
124. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing biomechanical
engineers’ critiques of medical doctors’ causation opinions).
125. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
126. See id. at 1353 (summarizing an orthopedist’s expert opinions).
127. See id. at 1375–76 (referencing the expert report of John Trimble,
Ph.D.).
128. See id. (describing Dr. Trimble’s causation opinions).
129. Id. at 1355.
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medical doctors’ opinions altogether, finding that the doctors
failed to establish general causation. 130 Notably, the district court
also excluded the biomechanical engineer’s specific causation
opinions due to his lack of medical qualifications. 131
The exclusion of the medical experts’ causation opinions in
Bowers is rare for two reasons. Commentators have observed that
plaintiffs can often establish a prima facie personal injury case
without general causation evidence, 132 especially when “the
mechanism of causation is well understood, the causal
relationship is well established, or the timing between cause and
effect is close.” 133 In addition, courts have found medical doctors
qualified to opine regarding all aspects of injury causation as long
as there is no conclusive evidence that contradicts the medical
doctors’ general causation opinions. 134 Therefore, plaintiffs must
establish general injury causation only in rare cases where the
mechanism of injury is not commonly associated with injury. 135

130. See id. at 1355 (noting a lack of evidence regarding the “amount of
vibration that is harmful to an individual, the length of time over which such
harm normally occurs” and “the nature of the resulting harm”).
131. Id.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM § 28,
cmt. c(3) (2010) (“[M]ost courts have appropriately declined to impose a
threshold requirement that a plaintiff always must prove causation with
epidemiologic evidence.”).
133. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 609 n.180.
134. See Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1986)
(“[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established before a doctor can
testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic
methodology . . . is sound . . . products liability law does not preclude recovery
until a ‘statistically significant’ number of people have been injured . . . .”);
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266–67 (D. Kan.
2002) (allowing a vascular surgeon to testify to general causation over objections
that the expert was not an epidemiologist); see also Layssard v. United States,
No. 06-0352, 2007 WL 4144936, at *7–8 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007) (allowing a
medical doctor to testify regarding causation and stating, “Put simply, medical
doctors are qualified—indeed, uniquely qualified—to offer opinions as to medical
causation; bio-mechanical engineers are not”).
135. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1355 (M.D. Ga.
2007) (stating that the unusually complex issue of causation stemming from
unknown amounts of vibration required evidence of the link between levels of
vibration and injury).
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F. Eskin v. Carden: An Alternative to the Smelser Rule
Not all courts adopt the Smelser distinction. 136 The Supreme
Court of Delaware, for example, has made no attempt to
distinguish between general and specific causation in personal
injury litigation. In Eskin v. Carden, 137 the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that trial judges may admit biomechanical
experts’ opinions that a particular injury did (or did not) result
from the forces of an accident “only where the trial judge
determines that the testimony reliably creates a connection
between the reaction of the human body generally to the forces
generated by the accident and the specific individual allegedly
injured.” 138
Simply put, the Eskin approach implies that biomechanical
experts are qualified to offer any type of causation opinion as long
as the methods used are reliable. Eskin also suggests that typical
biomechanical methodologies will be acceptable when a plaintiff’s
characteristics “fairly represent the average human body.” 139
Time has shown that courts adopting the Smelser rule exclude
specific causation opinions under the qualifications prong of the
Daubert analysis, while courts following the Eskin approach
exclude some of the same opinions under the reliability prong due
to a lack of testability, error rate, or “fit.” 140 The application of the
reliability prong is discussed in more detail in Part V.

136. See, e.g., Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1230 (Del. 2004) (making no
reference to Smelser and drawing no distinction between general and specific
causation).
137. 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004).
138. Id. at 1230.
139. Id. What may be the most common forensic biomechanical methodology
is discussed in Part V.
140. See id. at 1232 (excluding biomechanical expert testimony that failed to
establish a link between generic injury thresholds and a unique individual);
Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32, 38 (Del. 2004) (excluding generalized biomechanical
expert testimony due to unhelpfulness, risk of misleading the jury, and unfair
prejudice).
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G. The Smelser Rule is The Best Approach to Biomechanical
Expert Qualifications
The Eskin approach overestimates the ability of engineers to
adapt statistical curves in the biomechanical literature to any
individual plaintiff. 141 Another flaw in the Eskin approach is that
the scope of allowable testimony hinges on a difficult question:
whether the plaintiff’s body represents the “average human
body.” Delaware courts have struggled to decide whether
plaintiffs fall within the “norm” described in Eskin. 142 In reality,
even individuals who are young, healthy, and apparently
“normal” can be injured by forces below 1% on statistical risk
curves, 143 and biomechanical science offers no way to identify
which individuals will fall predictably along the statistical curve
and which will not. 144
The Sixth Circuit’s approach in Smelser is the better rule
because biomechanical engineers are typically unqualified to
examine individuals or adapt generalized data to specific
circumstances. 145 The appropriateness of the adoption of the
141. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of
biomechanical engineers to adapt general statistics to consider lifestyle, age,
sex, or pre-existing medical conditions which may play a role in injury
causation).
142. See Smith v. Grief, No. 308-2014, 2015 WL 128004, at *2 (Del. Jan. 8,
2015) (refusing to upset a trial court’s decision to allow biomechanical testimony
regarding the precise cause of an individual’s injuries despite the fact that the
plaintiff was pregnant); Mason, 89 A.3d at 38 (excluding a biomechanical
engineer’s causation opinions as lacking a connection to the plaintiff’s
characteristics where the plaintiff had pre-existing spinal injuries); DiVirgilio v.
Eskin, No. 02C-02-169, 2005 WL 2249530, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2005)
(excluding a biomechanical engineer’s opinions regarding precise causation of
injuries because the plaintiff was in an “unusual physical position” at the
moment of impact); Frazier v. Leotta, 54 A.3d 1134, 1148 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010)
(stating that the court was unsure whether a plaintiff who had apparently
recovered from pre-existing conditions fell within the “norm” mentioned in
Eskin and requesting further testimony on the issue).
143. See J.R. Funk et al., Biomechanical Risk Estimates for Mild Traumatic
Brain Injury, 51 ANN. PROC. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT AUTOMOTIVE MED. 343, 357–58
(2007) (reporting that a college football player suffered a concussion caused by
only eighty-one g-force of acceleration).
144. See id. (attributing wide variances in forces causing injury to football
players to “variation in injury tolerance between individuals”).
145. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of
biomechanical engineers to adapt general statistics to consider lifestyle, age,
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distinction between general and specific causation is supported
by the compelling similarities between biomechanics and
toxicology. 146 In addition, as discussed in Part V, even if
biomechanical engineers were qualified to offer specific injury
causation testimony, biomechanical methodologies are incapable
of determining specific injury causation with the degree of
reliability required under Daubert. 147
The adoption of the Smelser rule does not affect
biomechanical
engineers’
general
causation opinions. 148
Competent biomechanical engineers usually have the education
and experience necessary to calculate forces and testify about
how collisions can be expected to affect the human body based on
statistics in the biomechanical literature. 149 Biomechanical
engineers’ general causation opinions, however, must still assist
the trier of fact, be relevant and reliable, provide an adequate
“fit” to the facts of the case, be based on admissible data, and
must not be unfairly prejudicial. 150
V. The Reliability of Forensic Biomechanical Methodologies
This Part applies Daubert to typical biomechanical
methodologies and argues that those considerations weigh
against the admission of opinions based on extrapolation from
generic injury thresholds. Finally, this Part argues that
gender, sex, or pre-existing medical conditions that may play a role in injury
causation).
146. See supra Part IV.C (drawing an analogy between toxicology and
biomechanics).
147. See infra Part V.C (analyzing the accuracy of biomechanical methods
when used to predict injury causation).
148. See, e.g., Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (S.D.
Fla. 2009) (allowing biomechanical engineer testimony that accepted “the
injuries as diagnosed by other doctors” and focused “on the forces involved in the
blows sustained by [Berner] and . . . the levels at which certain injuries may
occur”).
149. See, e.g., Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1378 (M.D.
Ga. 2007) (applying the reasoning in Smelser to conclude that a biomechanical
engineer could “testify generally as to the effect of locomotive vibration on the
human body and the typical injuries that may result”).
150. Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L.
REV. 743, 746–50 (1999) (listing prerequisites for admissible expert testimony).
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biomechanics’ forensic analyses are not a reliable basis for
opinions ruling out general injury causation but may be a reliable
basis for opinions supporting general causation.
A. A Basic Overview of Forensic Biomechanics
Engineers calculate the “factor of safety” of a bridge,
structure, or other physical material by measuring its failure
strength against “the expected stress that object will see in
service.” 151 This analysis parallels the basic approach of some
leading biomechanical experts in personal injury litigation. 152
Biomechanics sometimes use a slightly modified ratio, known as
the “factor of risk,” to estimate risk of injury. 153 The basic
equation divides an anatomical region’s tolerance by the force
applied to that region. 154 If the equation produces a number
greater than one, the relative risk of injury is more probable than
not. 155
The factor of risk equation requires at least two variables:
(1) the level of force an anatomical region can tolerate without
injury, and (2) the amount of force applied to the anatomical
structure. 156 To discover these variables, biomechanical engineers
(1) accident
have
developed
a
three-step
analysis: 157
reconstruction; (2) simulation of kinematics; and (3) comparing
estimated forces to injury risk curves documented in the
biomechanical literature. 158 These three methodologies should be
considered separately.
151. See Joseph C. Musto, The Safety Factor: Case Studies in Engineering
Judgment, 38 INT’L J. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING EDUC. 286, 286–88 (2010)
(discussing the use of the safety factor in engineering education).
152. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 60 (comparing the factor of risk and
factor of safety equations).
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id.
155. See id. (stating that a result of “1” equals a 50% likelihood for injury
and that any likelihood greater than 50% is “probable”).
156. This does not capture the various methodologies used by every
biomechanical engineer; it only illustrates a common approach.
157. See Wilson C. Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 68 (outlining a three-step
approach for forensic biomechanical inquiries).
158. See id. (detailing the three-step analysis).
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B. Accident Reconstruction
A biomechanical expert must discover the severity of forces
in an accident before creating a computer simulation or
comparing forces against injury thresholds. 159 Accident
reconstruction involves “collecting information about a collision,
appl[ying] standard engineering principles to this information,
and determin[ing] the most probable sequence of events.” 160 Many
of the basic techniques of accident reconstruction are well
settled. 161
Other commentators have discussed various accident
reconstruction methodologies in detail. 162 For the purposes of this
Note, it is sufficient to mention that accident reconstruction
testimony is often admitted unless, for example, it relies on
photographs of vehicle damage, experience, or data that is plainly
incorrect. 163 Results of the accident reconstruction are used as
inputs for the next phases of the three-step analysis, 164 so
inaccurate accident reconstruction methods will render the entire
analysis unreliable. 165
159. See id. (outlining the three-step approach to biomechanical analyses,
with the first two steps conducted for the purpose of calculating forces).
160. Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 2000).
161. See 9 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, PROOF OF FACTS 115, § 12 (3d ed. 1990)
(listing equations commonly used in accident reconstruction).
162. See id. (detailing aspects of accident reconstruction, including
admissibility under Daubert, and collecting cases).
163. See, e.g., Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (applying both the Frye and Daubert standards to find that “[u]sing
repair costs and photographs as a method for calculating the change in velocity
of two vehicles at impact is not a generally accepted method in any relevant
field of engineering or under the laws of physics”); Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am.,
Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77 (D. Me. 2000) (finding accident reconstruction
opinions unreliable where the expert “derived the 12 m.p.h. figure in large part
from eyeballing accident photographs”).
164. See Krishnan et al., supra note 83, at 910 (noting that crash severity,
which is within the scope of accident reconstruction, includes “many factors such
as the direction of impact force, impact speed, crush characteristics of the
impact area, etc.,” which are used as inputs when simulating occupant
movements).
165. See Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77–78 (D.
Me. 2000) (excluding biomechanical engineer expert testimony as irrelevant
after concluding that the engineer’s method of “eyeballing” photographs to
estimate delta-V based on his experience was unreliable and stating that deltaV is “[a]n important data point” in creating a simulation).
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C. Simulation of Kinematics

While accident reconstruction is within the realm of
engineering, “[t]he study of occupant motion . . . is generally in
the realm of biomedical science.” 166 To simulate body movement
and forces, experts rely on complex computer programs that
apply the laws of physics in virtual environments. 167 These
computer programs allow researchers to perform parametric
studies to test vehicle design and safety features without the cost
and time otherwise necessary to build parts and crash vehicles. 168
The distinct features, measurements, weights and stiffness
values of each make and model of vehicle must be input into this
virtual environment using defined contact surfaces. 169 In
addition, minute details like seatbelt material or the seatbelt
spooling response must be included in the simulation. 170
The virtual occupants in these programs exist as ellipsoids
connected by joints; for example, one ellipsoid represents a head
while another represents a neck, and a mathematical formula
defines the interaction between the two. 171 The properties of
these ellipsoids are based on crash test dummies and are scaled
to different sizes using measurements from anthropometry
surveys. 172 It goes without saying that this method is imperfect.
For example, it is impossible to model the movement of the seven
vertebrae of a human neck with a single ellipsoid. 173 This
modelling is even more unreasonable when the plaintiff, like Mrs.
166. Krishnan et al., supra note 83, at 910.
167. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 69 (describing computer simulation
programs).
168. Terry D. Day & Randall L. Hargens, Application and Misapplication of
Computer Programs for Accident Reconstruction, SAE TECH. PAPER 890738, Feb.
1, 1989, at 129 (noting the uses of computer programs by government agencies,
vehicle manufacturers, police, and insurance companies).
169. See Michael B. James et al., Limitations of ATB/CVS as an Accident
Reconstruction Tool, SAE TECH. PAPER 971045, Feb. 24, 1997, at 1 (discussing
the process of building a computer simulation).
170. See id. at 6 (discussing the difficulties of simulating seat belts).
171. See id. at 1 (discussing the process of building a computer simulation).
172. See id. at 6 (describing the process of compiling data for simulation
ellipsoids).
173. See id. (“The joint parameters which are most critical in evaluating
occupant injury exposure are also the most difficult to define; namely those
characterizing the neck.”).
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1. Computer Program Validity and Peer Review
When considering the admissibility of opinions based on
computer simulations, courts should first ensure that the
program has been validated in peer-reviewed literature for the
type of incident the expert is attempting to model. 175 Due to
simplifications that must be made to create a computer model,
even a generally accepted computer simulation program that is
“based on the laws of physics and accepted principles of accident
reconstruction[] is not a reliable methodology in all factual
circumstances.” 176 Without validation, courts cannot determine
whether a computer model reliably simulates the accident at
issue. 177
2. Error Rate and the “Fit” of a Simulation to the Facts of a Case
Validation studies for some of the most prominent programs
have reported rates of error as low as 2% to 17%. 178 While some
courts have admitted opinions on the strength of these error rates
alone, 179 judges should also consider whether the computer
174. See supra Part I (setting forth the story of Mrs. Crandall).
175. See Turner v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 163, 2007 WL
2713062, at *3–4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2007) (finding a computer simulation
program validated where it was subject to peer review and publication, has
known error rates, and is generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community).
176. Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
177. See id. (excluding opinions based on a computer simulation where the
expert failed to show that the program had been tested or validated in any way
for a scenario similar to the crash at issue).
178. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 69 (listing published error rates for
the Engineering Dynamics Simulation Model of Automobile Collisions and the
ATB).
179. See, e.g., Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258,
1261 (D.N.D. 2004) (finding the use of the ATB computer simulation “somewhat
suspect” but allowing opinions based on the simulation because the computer
program was relied on by the Air Force and government agencies).
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program is capable of fitting the facts of their specific case and
whether the expert’s opinion takes into account the limitations of
the simulation. 180
As an illustration of the limitations of computer simulations,
authors of one validation study commented that “[t]he
passenger’s injuries were . . . difficult to compare because of the
ejection and their severity. While severe injuries were evident in
both the accident and simulation, the multiple impacts make it
hard to determine the exact causes.” 181 The authors concluded
that “[a]lthough [the simulations] may not exactly reconstruct the
accident events, they do provide likely occupant responses that
can be used in parameter studies investigating injury
countermeasures.” 182
In another example, researchers validating the “Articulated
Total Body” model (ATB) produced a reasonably good modeling of
occupant responses but noted the need for sufficient input data to
obtain the desired results. 183 The authors concluded that
“significant variations . . . result from moderate changes in the
initial position of the occupant’s body and his seat and angular
configuration” 184 and that the simulation was “capable of
delivering reasonable peak-level acceleration results and
approximate time intervals, once appropriate vehicle and
occupant mass, stiffness, energy dissipation, seat back and
occupant position data are input.” 185 Computer models require
thousands of input parameters to produce results with levels of
accuracy that compare with the rates of error published in
validation studies. 186 Many more variables are available during
180. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (warning that validated
computer programs can be unreliable when misused).
181. See Huaining Cheng et al., ATB Model Simulation of a Rollover
Accident with Occupant Ejection, SAE TECH. PAPER 950134, Feb. 1, 1995, at 30
(describing the collision and injuries).
182. Id.
183. I.U. Ojalvo & H. Yanowitz, Vehicle and Occupant Response to Low
Speed Impact: Comparison of Analysis with Test and Parametric Study, SAE
TECH. PAPER 980300, Feb. 23, 1998, at 4 (noting that only one of several
controlled crash tests provided enough inputs to perform the study).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1.
186. See James et al., supra note 169, at 1 (noting that the Articulated Total
Body (ATB) program contains between 3,000 and 7,000 parameters).
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controlled laboratory validations than exist in real-world
investigations. 187
Validation studies suggest two ways experts could misuse
computer simulations. First, an expert might represent that a
simulation shows the way an accident actually occurred or how
an individual actually moved during a collision, rather than just
one possible way the occupant might have moved. 188 Second, an
expert might rely on a simulation that lacks sufficient input
data. 189
To avoid misuse, scholars have recommended that experts
run a series of simulations to test for sensitivity to error
attributable to missing variables and present data as a range of
possible results. 190 Despite these suggestions, many courts have
not excluded opinions based on computer simulations despite
apparent deficiencies, reasoning that defects go to the weight and
not admissibility of the expert’s opinion. 191 Still, judges should be
wary of opinions based on computer simulations where there is
simply “too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion.” 192

187. See id. (noting that many of the input parameters may not be available
for real-world collisions); L.A. Obergefell, I. Kaleps & A.K. Johnson, Prediction
of an Occupant’s Motion During Rollover Crashes, SAE TECH. PAPER 861876,
Oct. 1986, at 14 (stating that “considerable information is required for the
simulation of a crash test” and listing necessary parameters).
188. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (warning against the use of
a single simulation to represent the only way a crash could have happened).
189. See Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(excluding a computer simulation of a roll-over accident in part due to
simplifications in the operation of the model).
190. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (listing recommendations to
guard against the erroneous use of computer programs by forensic experts).
191. See, e.g., Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258,
1261 (D.N.D. 2004) (finding the use of the ATB computer simulation “somewhat
suspect” and stating that “[t]he expert opinions are weak but, . . . the
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence is through crossexamination”); Burke v. TranSam Trucking, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (“Defendants’ arguments and criticisms of Dr. Ziejewski’s
methodology and inputs used went more to the weight of the evidence, rather
than to his ability to testify as an expert in this case.”).
192. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (recognizing that
“[t]rained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data,” but this does not
warrant admitting opinion based “only by the ipse dixit of the expert”).
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D. Comparison to Documented Injury Thresholds

The two methods discussed above culminate in the
approximation of forces applied to anatomical regions. 193 The
final step in the three-step biomechanical analysis involves the
comparison of those forces against documented injury
thresholds. 194
1. The Nature of Biomechanical Injury Thresholds
Biomechanical injury thresholds are based on experimental
studies that aim to uncover causal links and risk curves in
populations. 195 Researchers attempting to discover human injury
thresholds encounter a paradox: the thresholds can be properly
tested “only by using the human subject, but the tests cannot be
performed in a manner to jeopardize his well-being or life.” 196
Because controlled tests of humans are often ethically impossible,
researchers have resorted to testing cadavers, 197 live volunteers
in limited circumstances, 198 and animals. 199 Researchers then
193. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 68 (outlining a three-step approach
to biomechanical analyses, with the first two steps conducted for the purpose of
calculating forces).
194. See id. (outlining the three-step method).
195. See id. at 58–60 (discussing several statistical injury risk curves).
196. See Edwin Hendler et al., Effect of Head and Body Position and
Muscular Tensing on Response to Impact, in HUMAN SUBJECT CRASH TESTING:
INNOVATIONS AND ADVANCES 218 (Lawrence S. Nordhoff Jr., Michael D. Freeman
& Gunter P. Siegmund eds., 2007) (discussing the difficulties of testing
automotive protective equipment).
197. See Suanez v. Egeland, 801 A.2d 1186, 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (“The only specific scientific tests to which Thibault referred were
performed either upon cadavers or upon military personnel under controlled
conditions . . . .”); see also Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 903 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 942 A.2d 769 (2006) (noting that the biomechanical
engineer had “conducted experiments with cadaver parts, determining the
strength of various materials making up the musculoskeletal system”).
198. See, e.g., Suanez, 801 A.2d at 1193 (referencing tests on military
personnel under controlled conditions).
199. See W. N. Newberry et al., Analysis of Acute Mechanical Insult in an
Animal Model of Post-Traumatic Osteoarthrosis, 120 J. BIOMECHANICAL
ENGINEERING 704, 704–06 (1998) (using rabbits to study the effect of chronic
degeneration of cartilage and bone after exposure to forces exceeding a
threshold of injury); see also Liying Zhang, King H. Yang & Albert I. King, A
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attempt to match those tests with observations of trauma victims
in the general population. 200
Another way of gathering data for an injury threshold is to
outfit a group of subjects with accelerometers, subject them to
traumatic forces, and “normaliz[e] the injury incidence data by
the . . . exposure data.” 201 Importantly, biomechanical engineers
gathering data typically rely on medical doctors to determine
whether subjects were actually injured during the test and what
injuries were sustained. 202 Some injury thresholds are relatively
well-established in the field of biomechanics and have been used
outside the litigation context. 203 Other thresholds are tentative. 204
2. The Reliability of Injury Causation Opinions Based on Injury
Thresholds
The reliability of a forensic biomechanical analysis depends
on whether results of population-based studies can be
extrapolated with accuracy to specific individuals and
circumstances. 205 The practice of forensic epidemiology employs
Proposed Injury Threshold for Traumatic Brain Injury, 126 J. BIOMECHANICAL
ENGINEERING 226, 226 (2004) (noting that existing head injury criteria were
based on “head acceleration results from animal concussion tests and cadaveric
skull fractures”).
200. See Augenstein & Digges, supra note 23, at 1–2 (discussing
biomechanical engineer’s collection of data gleaned from patients suffering
traumatic injuries). For example, the Nij, a neck injury criterion, was “originally
derived from porcine neck testing” and was “then matched to injuries observed
in real world non-rollover frontal crashes.” Freeman & Kohles, Forensic
Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 462.
201. See id. at 343–45, 356–57 (2007) (gathering head impact data from
sixty-four football players over four years and proposing a modification to
current mild traumatic brain injury risk curves).
202. See id. at 345 (“Impacts were classified as injurious based on a
diagnosis of concussion by the team physician.”).
203. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 58–60, 62–62 (discussing the
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), Head Injury Criterion (HIC), and the Neck
Injury Criteria (NIC) and their uses).
204. See Funk et al., supra note 143, at 359 (noting that “50% risk levels for
concussion cannot be calculated reliably because the exposure data are
extremely sparse” and stating that proposed injury curves for concussion “are
only a first attempt at calculating injury assessment risk values from limited
injury data”).
205. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 69
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population-based data “as a basis for evaluating the consistency
of findings in an individual case with what is plausibly associated
with a particular injury mechanism.” 206 The appeal of
epidemiological evidence in personal injury cases is that it can be
adapted easily to the 50%-plus probability standard familiar to
courts. 207 A probability derived from epidemiological evidence is
known as relative risk. 208 For purposes of illustration, imagine a
box filled with balls. A sampling test shows that 60% are blue and
the others are white. In this example, the relative risk that one
will randomly select a blue ball from the box is 60%. 209 Once the
ball has been selected, however, the relative risk does not matter
because the ball is either blue or white. 210 Statisticians have
commented that “there is no logically rigorous definition of what
a statement of probability means with reference to an individual
instance.” 211
a. Testability
Outside of litigation, injury risk curves can be tested and
revised, at least in limited ways, by comparing predictions of
injury based on biomechanical risk curves against actual injuries
observed in subjects. 212 Some—if not most—forensic applications
(discussing the difficulties of extrapolating from biomechanical literature to
specific cases).
206. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18,
at 459.
207. Id. at 611.
208. See id. (discussing the use of relative risk to make statements about the
probability of individual causation). For a more thorough discussion of the role
of relative risk in causation determinations, see Laubach, supra note 91, at
1036–39.
209. Id. at 611 n.188 (illustrating relative risk and describing frequentist
statisticians’ opposition to subjective probability statements).
210. Id.
211. Lee Loevinger, On Logic and Sociology, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 527, 530
(1992). The same principle is true in toxic torts, where the use of relative risk
may be “misleading when a plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic susceptibility to
a particular substance.” Laubach, supra note 91, at 1039.
212. See, e.g., Funk et al., supra note 143, at 345 (testing and proposing
modifications to an injury risk curve based on observations of injuries in a study
and noting that “[i]mpacts were classified as injurious based on a diagnosis of
concussion by the team physician”).
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of the three-step biomechanical analysis also rely on medical
doctors’ diagnoses to test the accuracy of the analysis. 213
Ironically, biomechanical experts in litigation regularly critique
medical doctors’ diagnoses. 214 But without deferring to medical
doctors, there is no way to test the application of a biomechanical
expert’s forensic analysis. It is impossible to acquire samples of
the materials at issue—the plaintiff’s tissue or bones—to test the
expert’s method by calculating the plaintiff’s true tolerance to
injury. 215 A lack of ability to test the forensic biomechanical
method weighs against the admission of specific injury causation
opinions. 216
b. Peer Review
Forensic biomechanical analyses have been used outside
litigation to examine likely mechanisms of injuries in deceased
subjects, 217 and to opine whether safety features such as seat
belts might have mitigated injuries. 218 These studies often use
the three-step analysis used by biomechanical experts in
litigation. 219 Very few or none of these studies, however, attempt
to determine whether an individual was actually injured. 220
213. See ROBERT A. GALGANSKI ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., CRASH VISUALIZATION USING REAL-WORLD ACCELERATION DATA 1 (2001)
(comparing injuries in medical records with injury predictions based on
computer simulations).
214. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing biomechanical
engineers’ critiques of medical doctors’ causation opinions).
215. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility
of measuring or testing individual injury thresholds).
216. See, e.g., Berry v. Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (noting that “courts interpreting Daubert have considered
testability of the expert’s theory to be the most important of the four factors”).
217. See Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 464 (describing a joint medical and
biomechanical investigation to discover traumatology and a potential cause of
death).
218. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 15 (discussing the
benefit of computer simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school
bus roll-over as a tool “to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues
for similar types of accidents”).
219. See Hayes et al., supra note 33 at 68–69 (citing peer-reviewed and
published studies that employed the three-step analysis).
220. See infra notes 221–223 and accompanying text (discussing cases cited

1100

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2016)

Instead, these studies use the three-step analysis to predict the
effect of seat belt use, 221 to show that computer simulations’
predictions compare reasonably well to actual occupant dynamics
and to injuries previously diagnosed by medical doctors, 222 or to
predict whether proposed design and safety features in
automobiles and aircraft might reduce the potential for human
injury. 223 In these studies, the biomechanical analysis is not used
to dispute the medical doctor’s injury causation opinion but
rather to explain how the trauma might have caused the
injuries. 224 In other words, the three-step biomechanical analysis
is used most often outside of litigation “after a causal
determination has been made, as a means of explaining
injuries.” 225
In sum, the three-step biomechanical analysis has been
accepted by the biomechanical community and appears in peerreviewed literature, but it has not been applied for the same
purpose that it is being used in litigation. 226 This presents a
by Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D., as supporting the three-step analysis as a method
for determining specific injury causation).
221. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 15 (discussing the
benefit of computer simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school
bus roll-over as a tool “to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues
for similar types of accidents”).
222. See Kennerly H. Digges, Reconstruction of Frontal Accidents Using the
CVS-3D Model, SAE TECH. PAPER 840869, Apr. 1, 1984, at 1–2 (“The results
computed by the model are quite reasonable when compared with the injuries
received by the occupant.”); C. Clark, Simulation of Road Crash Facial
Lacerations By Broken Windshields, SAE TECH. PAPER 870320, Feb. 23, 1987, at
1–3 (“The physical simulations approximated the damage observed in the three
accidents.”).
223. See L. Obergefell, Computer Simulation Of Human Body Dynamics, 2 J.
GRAVITATIONAL PHYSIOLOGY 92, 92–93 (1995) (noting the usefulness of this
methodology in testing safety features due to the constraints in testing actual
human subjects); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., 15-PASSENGER CHILD CARE VAN
RUN-OFF-ROAD ACCIDENT MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 45–46 (Apr. 4, 2002) (using
biomechanical principles and computer simulations to conclude that the use of a
different vehicle and the proper use of child restraints could have mitigated
injuries in a crash).
224. See Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 463–65 (describing a
biomechanical analysis as an adjunct to a medical investigation regarding
traumatology and cause of death in an individual).
225. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18,
at 460 (emphasis in original).
226. See supra notes 222–225 and accompanying text (collecting studies
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danger that biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions
are based on a method that does not justify their conclusions. 227
c. Error Rate
The second step of the three-step analysis is the only method
that has published error rates. 228 Courts should avoid conflating
the error rates of computer simulations with biomechanical
experts’ methods of predicting injury. Because there are no
published error rates for the other methods in the three-step
biomechanical analysis, courts should consider implicit error rate
issues, including validity, specificity, and accuracy. 229
Regarding validity, inferences drawn from experimental
studies “are justified only when the sample is representative.” 230
The subjects of biomechanical studies are often not
representative of the larger population. 231 The confidence in an
extrapolation from biomechanical studies to a different
population—let alone a unique individual—is low because
biomechanical engineers cannot quantify “outside factors that
would or would not affect the outcome,” 232 such as pre-existing
injury, lifestyle, age, sex, and other factors. 233
employing the three-step biomechanical analysis and describing the purposes of
those studies).
227. See Meixner & Diamond, supra note 65, at 1090 (noting that experts
err when they “base[] an opinion on some scientifically derived data, but those
data could not justify the conclusion that was drawn”).
228. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (listing published rates of
error for computer simulation programs).
229. See Meixner & Diamond, supra note 65, at 1067 (stating that where
numerical error rates are unavailable, “the judge must examine the
methodology for flaws that are likely to produce errors”).
230. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 84, § 6:8.
231. See infra notes 272–273 and accompanying text (discussing the
inability of biomechanical studies to contain the quantity and types of subjects
or conditions that reflect those seen in the real world).
232. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:18.
233. See Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Del. 2004) (stating that
“[t]he use of applied physics by trained engineers aided by computer
simulations . . . does create indicia of reliability” but that “[i]f the crash test
dummy or a member of the control group is replaced with an uniquely
susceptible driver, those indicia of reliability become a facade”).
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Forensic biomechanical methods may also lack specificity
because many injury risk curves are based on anatomical regions
and do not distinguish between specific injuries. For example, the
Head Injury Criterion “does not distinguish among types of head
injuries such as skull fractures, subdural hematoma, [or] diffuse
axonal injury.” 234 In addition, the computer simulations used by
biomechanical engineers can only estimate forces applied to
anatomical regions (represented by ellipsoids) instead of specific
anatomic structures. 235
With regard to accuracy, relative risk calculations are known
to result in false positives and false negatives. For example,
researchers who proposed a risk curve for mild traumatic brain
injury observed that one of the subjects suffered a concussion
after a hit generating forces below the proposed 1% mark, while
some sustained much higher impacts without injury. 236 The
researchers stated that “[t]he variation in injury tolerance
between individuals explains why high severity impacts cause
[mild traumatic brain injury] in some players but not others.” 237
In another context, biomechanical engineers hired by the
National Transportation Safety Board to analyze school bus
crashworthiness gathered data and simulated bus accidents
using five different computer programs. 238 The biomechanical
engineers compared predicted injuries against actual injuries
sustained. 239 The biomechanical experts’ methods failed to predict
the actual injuries sustained by two of six occupants analyzed in
one crash, and predicted thorax injuries for a third occupant who,
234. Steven C. Batterman & Scott D. Batterman, Forensic Engineering and
Science, in FORENSIC SCIENCE AND LAW: INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS IN
CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND FAMILY JUSTICE 566 (Cyril H. Wecht & John T. Rago eds.,
2006).
235. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 466 (“[A] precise or even rough estimate of the magnitude, direction,
and rate of load sustained at a given disk level may be virtually impossible to
determine given the number of unknown variables required to accurately
reconstruct the intraspinal loads induced by the collision.”).
236. See Funk et al., supra note 143, at 350 (reporting study results).
237. Id. at 358.
238. See NAT’L TRANP. SAFETY BD., HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT:
BUS CRASHWORTHINESS 5–6, 15–16 (Sept. 21, 1999) (stating the goals of the
research and explaining the simulation methodology).
239. See id. at 23 tbl.3 (comparing actual and predicted injuries).
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in reality, suffered no injury. 240 These are only a few examples of
the inaccuracy of relative risk opinions. 241 Yet without an error
rate, one has no way of understanding how often a biomechanical
analysis will produce a false positive or negative. 242
In sum, considerations of validity, specificity, and accuracy
weigh against the reliability of the three-step analysis when used
as evidence of specific injury causation. The three-step analysis is
capable of calculating relative risk of injury based on proposed
thresholds, but its ability to predict the actual outcome is
suspect. 243 These considerations weigh against the reliability of
specific causation opinions and support scientists’ arguments that
relative risk should play “a highly circumscribed role in
evaluating causation.” 244
d. Advisory Committee Notes Factors
This Subsection applies the five considerations in the
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 in the order they are listed
in Part III.B.2. 245 First, a biomechanical engineer is most likely to
testify about matters growing out of research independent of
litigation when he or she testifies regarding injury causation
generally. Some biomechanical experts have conducted
experimental tests related to injury thresholds or injury
240. See id. (same).
241. See Allan F. Tencer et al., Femur Fractures in Relatively Low Speed
Frontal Crashes: The Possible Role of Muscle Forces, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
PREVENTION, 1, 7 (2002) (listing femur fractures suffered at forces supposed to
have only a 17% to 27% probability of injury according to biomechanical
thresholds); Batterman & Batterman, supra note 234, at 566 (“[I]t is possible for
a person to walk away uninjured from an accident with an HIC greater than
1000 while a person can die from a head injury in a crash where the HIC was
significantly less than 1000.”).
242. See Freeman & Kolhes, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 70
(examining problematic error rates in forensic biomechanics analyses).
243. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 467 (“Forensic biomechanical analysis is a useful adjunctive tool in
forensic medicine, however limitations in its use must be acknowledged and
heeded, otherwise the potential for erroneous application arises.”).
244. Id. at 459.
245. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (listing considerations for
reliability included in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702).
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mechanics. 246 These studies, however, are population-based.
Unlike medical doctors, biomechanical engineers outside of
litigation do not determine whether or not a specific incident
actually caused an individual’s injuries, except when a
biomechanical analysis is an adjunct to medical studies. 247
Second, there is a danger of unjustifiable extrapolation
because injury risk curves were originally developed to help
designers “create equipment, rules, and operating procedures”
that reduce the risk of injury, not as a means of judging whether
a specific trauma was the cause of an individual’s injuries. 248 The
risk of unjustified extrapolation is at its highest when
biomechanical engineers extrapolate general data to plaintiffs
and circumstances dissimilar from the test subjects and
circumstances in the biomechanical literature. 249
Third, biomechanical engineers cannot identify or rule out
other obvious causes of injury because they lack the medical
expertise to identify pre-existing injuries and diseases that can
contribute to or cause injury. 250
246. Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 766 (Wash. App. 2012) (noting that a
biomechanical expert had received government grants to research mechanisms
of cervical injuries and that the expert had conducted tests aimed at developing
improved car seat head restraints for prevention of impact injuries).
247. See, e.g., Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 463–65 (describing a joint
biomechanical analysis adjunct to a medical investigation of traumatology and
cause of death).
248. Charles F. Babbs, A New Biomechanical Head Injury Criterion, 6 J.
MECHANICS MED. & BIOLOGY 349, 350 (2006); see also Batterman & Batterman,
supra note 234, at 565–66 (explaining that injury thresholds entered the law
when the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 introduced the
concept of vehicle crashworthiness and required designers to comply with
certain injury criteria); Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000)
(“[T]he court questioned the validity of using a series of tests designed for one
purpose (designing cars) for a different purpose (assessing a threshold of applied
force for injury in rear-end car accident).”).
249. See Tittsworth v. Robinson, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263–64 (Va. 1996)
(excluding biomechanical expert testimony where there was “no proof that these
experiments were conducted under circumstances substantially similar to those
existing at the accident scene”).
250. See Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1231 (Del. 2004) (finding Lawrence
Thibault, D.Sc. incompetent to take into account a plaintiff’s pre-existing
condition and proclivity to further injury where he did not review medical
records or examine the plaintiff and stating that no evidence suggested “that
any expert in his field would be competent, or would have taken the opportunity
to do so”).
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Fourth, there is a danger that biomechanical experts
employed as litigation consultants do not employ the same rigor
as biomechanical researchers in the field. 251 For example,
biomechanical experts typically rely on a single simulation
attempt to show the way an accident occurred, while researchers
in the field use a range of studies to account for missing
variables, use multiple computer programs to verify simulation
results, or at least make known the assumptions and limitations
of their methodologies. 252
Fifth, the biomechanical field is relied upon outside of
litigation to predict injury in populations, not in individuals. 253 In
addition, there is no consensus in the field of biomechanics that
injury thresholds reliably measure actual injuries, 254 especially
under circumstances different than the test circumstances. 255
These factors also weigh against the reliability of biomechanical
experts’ specific causation opinions when based on the three-step
forensic biomechanical method.

251. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xv
I’m being asked here to render an opinion whether a singular event
caused a set of alleged injuries in a particular person. That is
generally not the intent of the papers that I have either submitted, or
I have served as the editor of a journal and reviewed literally
thousands of them. It’s a different setting entirely.
252. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 16–17, 80–81 (noting
that researchers used two computer simulation programs and listing the
researchers’ data input assumptions and the limitations of their computer
simulations).
253. See id. at 23 tbl.3 (acknowledging discrepancies between predicted and
diagnosed injuries and relying on medical diagnoses as the actual injuries
suffered by the occupants).
254. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting a trial
court’s finding that there “is great controversy in the field about the quality and
comparability of [biomechanical] tests” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Wach & Unarski, supra note 25, at 136 (explaining that, although
biomechanical literature on falls is extensive, it is concerned primarily with
statistical data which “are not directly applicable in individual cases”).
255. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 462
(noting that the Nij risk curve was “originally derived from porcine neck testing”
and “has not been validated for injury mechanisms outside of frontal traffic
collisions”; therefore, “any use of the metric for other injury mechanisms should
be approached with caution”).
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3. The Reliability of General Injury Causation Opinions

General causation opinions are more directly related to the
biomechanical literature, require less extrapolation, and better
reflect biomechanical opinions offered outside of litigation. 256
Biomechanical expert testimony that claims to rule out the
possibility of injury in any human at a given force, however,
raises special reliability concerns. 257
a. Opinions Ruling Out Causation Based on “Activities of Daily
Living” Theories
For some parts of the body, such as arteries, no injury
threshold has been proposed. 258 When no published threshold
exists, some biomechanical experts have testified that forces
associated with “activities of daily living” can substitute as a
threshold below which no injury to any anatomic structure is
likely. 259 Researchers have measured forces associated with
coughing, stepping off a curb, skipping rope, and lifting. 260 Some
researchers have attempted to bolster the “activities of daily
256. See, e.g., Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007 WL
1576708, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (allowing general causation opinions
and noting that the plaintiffs conceded that biomechanical engineers may be
qualified to testify to risk factors in general).
257. See infra Part V.C.3.a (discussing the weaknesses of opinions ruling out
causation).
258. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, Exhibit A at 22 (recording
the following statement made by Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D. in response to a
deposition question regarding the existence of an arterial injury threshold: “At
the level of forces necessary, I don’t know, and believe no data are available”).
259. See id. at 31–32 (“[I]f the forces are well within activities of daily living,
our literature tells us, basically, you can’t establish that the event caused the
injury.”); Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 850 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting proffered
biomechanical evidence “related to the results of automobile collision
experiments with human volunteers; specifically, the resulting threshold of force
below which a person probably could not be injured in a rear-end automobile
collision”).
260. See Schultz, 13 P.3d at 852 (listing “activities of daily living” used by a
biomechanical expert to support his causation opinion); see also James R. Funk
et al., Head and Neck Loading in Everyday and Vigorous Activities, 39 ANNALS
BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 766, 767 (2011) (collecting data from activities,
including soccer ball impact, self-imposed hand strike to the forehead, chair tip,
“chair plop,” vigorous head shake, seated drop, and jump off a step).

HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE?

1107

living” threshold with bumper car experiments and low speed
crash tests. 261 One prominent biomechanical expert has testified
that “if the forces are well within activities of daily living, our
literature tells us, basically, you can’t establish that the event
caused the injury.” 262 This type of opinion attacks a criterion of
general causation known as plausibility. 263
(1) Problems with Establishing Implausibility
The first problem with this type of opinion is the misuse of
the “plausibility” criterion. An injury is plausible when an
exposure “could reasonably have caused the disease or injury
outcome (regardless of how often).” 264 Biomechanical engineers’
attack on the link between low-level force and injury commits the
“fallacy of the transposed conditional by concluding that the
absence of evidence of biomechanical plausibility of causation is
equivalent to evidence of implausibility.” 265
In reality, plausibility “is met when there is a lack of
established implausibility (impossibility).” 266 Therefore, “[r]arity
is not the same as implausibility.” 267 Anecdotal evidence of
injuries sustained at low levels of force supports an inference that
injury at low levels of trauma does occur, although rarely. 268
Implausibility is only established when a theory of injury
causation violates a fundamental biologic principle that is
261. See VINOD VIJAYAKUMAR ET AL., HEAD KINEMATICS AND UPPER NECK
LOADING DURING SIMULATED LOW-SPEED REAR-END COLLISIONS: A COMPARISON
WITH VIGOROUS ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING 2 (2006) (comparing head kinematics
in bumper car collisions with low speed vehicle collision data in the
biomechanical literature).
262. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, Exhibit A at 22.
263. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 463–64 (discussing biomechanical engineers’ use of Bradford Hill
criteria with respect to general injury causation).
264. Id. at 463 (emphasis in original).
265. Id. at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id. at 462 (emphasis in original).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Doré DeBartolo, A Case of Cauda Equina Syndrome Caused by
a Simple Sneeze, 3 OSTEOPATHIC FAM. PHYSICIAN 27, 27 (concluding that a
sneeze was the inciting event for nerve compression in the spine of a patient
with pre-existing lumbar spine conditions).
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universally accepted and incontrovertible. 269 One example is the
principle that trauma cannot cause “brain tumors to appear
spontaneously overnight.” 270 The body of “activities of daily
living” studies is not substantial and convincing enough to
establish implausibility. 271
(2) The Validity and Sufficiency of “Activities of Daily Living”
Studies
Most “activities of daily living” studies include between
twenty and thirty subjects, suggesting that the studies may not
have sufficient statistical power to exonerate a link between lowlevel trauma and injury. 272 These studies usually exclude subjects
with pre-existing medical conditions or disease, as well as young
and elderly subjects. 273 The studies therefore “cannot contain the
quantity and types of subjects and conditions that sufficiently
represent the range of variety seen in real world subjects and
conditions.” 274
In addition, selection bias plagues these experimental
studies. 275 True randomization is impossible because the subjects
269. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 463 (“Implausibility is only established when cause and effect is
ruled out because of the violation of a fundamental biologic principle . . . .”).
270. Id.
271. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:4 (noting that negative
epidemiological evidence must be so strong that it cannot be rebutted by reliable
and scientifically valid methodologies).
272. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting a trial
court’s finding that the statistical sample in tests used by a biomechanical
engineer was “extremely low”); see also VIJAYAKUMAR ET AL., supra note 261, at 3
(conducting a study on thirty volunteer subjects); Funk et al., supra note 260, at
767 (conducting a study on twenty volunteer subjects).
273. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 615 (discussing the
problems of using probabilities when two agents may combine to increase the
probability of causation).
274. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18,
at 464; see also Batterman & Batterman, supra note 234, at 566 (noting that
“normal biological variation across the population spectrum is not accounted for”
in the research of injury thresholds).
275. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 464 (stating that the “effect of bias and scatter on the extrapolation
of tolerance specifications” makes it difficult to establish implausibility with
biomechanical experimental studies).
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choose their own exposure rather than being randomly assigned
to groups. 276 Researchers in this area typically do not select
control groups, making it impossible to compare differences
between individuals who were subjected (or subjected
themselves) to trauma and those who were not. 277 In at least one
of these studies, every test subject was an employee at a firm
specializing in biomechanical forensics and consulting, and the
subjects therefore may have had an interest in the outcome of the
research. 278
Finally, the authors of one study reported that up to half of
the participants dropped out before the study was complete. 279
Researchers have failed to investigate whether those who decline
to participate in these studies or drop out before its completion
differ significantly from those who do not. 280 These deficiencies
call into serious question the practice of generalizing the results
of activities of daily living studies to populations and conditions
outside the test subjects and circumstances. 281

276. See Funk et al., supra note 260, at 767 (noting that the volunteer test
subjects could choose not to participate in any activity).
277. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (referencing a
trial court’s exclusion of a biomechanical expert’s opinions in part because there
were “no controls among and between the experiments with regard to age,
physical conditions [and] actual position of the body” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 84, § 6:9 (“[O]utcome figures from
a treatment group without a control group generally reveal very little and can
be misleading. Comparisons are essential.”).
278. See Funk et al., supra note 260, at 767 (noting that all twenty
volunteers were selected from a pool of employee-volunteers at the Biodynamic
Research Corporation).
279. See id. (noting that the study included twenty volunteers, only ten of
which completed all tests in the study).
280. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 584 (explaining the need
for further investigation when those selected to participate decline or drop out to
avoid selection bias).
281. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra
note 18, at 464 (stating that studies “of animal, cadaver, and human volunteer
subjects produce results that describe only a part of the spectrum of injury
response to a nearly infinite range and combination of injury scenarios in the
real world”).
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b. Opinions Ruling Out Causation Based on Mechanisms of
Injury
Similarly, negative evidence regarding mechanisms of injury
is usually insufficient to rule out causation. It is common for a
single type of injury to have multiple potential triggering
mechanisms. 282 Mechanisms of injury based on researchers’
observations depend on the accuracy of subjects’ memory, and
direct study of injury in live subjects is extremely limited by
instrumentation technology and for ethical reasons. 283 As a
result, the suspected mechanics of many injuries are tentative or
inexhaustive. 284 In addition, biomechanical engineers frequently
draw from medical literature to identify mechanisms of injury but
are usually unqualified to rule out competing mechanisms of
injury that involve disease or pre-existing conditions. 285 These
considerations show that biomechanical literature on
mechanisms of injury is typically not sufficient to rule out injury
causation. 286
282. See, e.g., DeBartolo, supra note 268, at 27–28 (stating that the most
common cause of Cauda Equina Syndrome is midline disc herniation, but that
other causes include spinal metastases, hematoma, epidural abscess, traumatic
compression, acute transverse myelitis, spinal stenosis, tumor, ankylosing
spondylitis, following traction or spinal manipulation, after epidural steroid
injection, or as a post-operative complication).
283. See Kashiro Ono & Koji Kaneoka, Motion Analysis of Human Cervical
Vertebrae During Low Speed Rear Impacts by the Simulated Sled, reprinted in
HUMAN SUBJECT CRASH TESTING: INNOVATIONS AND ADVANCES 758–59, 757
(Lawrence S. Nordhoff Jr., Michael D. Freeman & Gunter P. Siegmund eds.,
2007) (noting the supervision of an ethics committee and limiting sled testing to
staged collisions at less than four miles per hour).
284. Yu Shao et al., Blunt Liver Injury with Intact Ribs Under Impacts on
the Abdomen: A Biomechanical Investigation, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2013) (“[T]he
hidden kinematic interactions between the liver and other abdominal organs are
impossible to measure using standard biomechanical instrumentation. So the
actual process and biomechanism of blunt liver injury still remain
inexhaustive.”).
285. See DeBartolo, supra note 268, at 27–28 (listing thirteen known
mechanisms for Cauda Equina Syndrome, only a few of which involve direct
trauma)
286. See Roach v. Hughes, No. 4:13-CV-00136-JHM, 2015 WL 3970739, at
*12 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2015) (excluding a biomechanical engineer’s specific
injury causation opinion that was based on the engineer’s testimony that the
“accident did not provide a mechanism to produce the brachial plexus injury
described in [the plaintiff’s] medical records”).
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VI. The Helpfulness and Relevance of General Causation Opinions
This Part applies the third prong of the Daubert analysis to
biomechanical expert testimony. It discusses the helpfulness and
relevance of general causation opinions in personal injury litigation
and argues that otherwise admissible general causation opinions
are not relevant in all cases and can be misleading and unfairly
prejudicial when the plaintiff differs from test subjects in the
biomechanical literature.
Biomechanical engineers’ testimony regarding estimated forces
in a collision may be helpful when the degree of trauma experienced
is at issue in a case. 287 Many courts have taken the position that—at
least as a matter of probability—there is “a correlation between the
nature of the vehicular impact and the severity of the personal
injuries.” 288 Therefore, some courts have found that evidence
concerning the severity of the impact is relevant despite the fact
that some “very minor impacts lead to serious personal injuries, and
vice versa.” 289 This rationale, however, may not apply in cases
where the plaintiff’s injury could be caused at any level of trauma or
could occur in the absence of trauma. 290
Whether similar forces create a heightened risk of injury in the
general population may be relevant in some cases, such as Bowers,
where the mechanism of injury is not well understood.291 In other
cases involving traumatic injury, however, courts have found
287. See Schwartz v. Morrison, No. 12-CV-01001, 2013 WL 3216138, at *1
(D. Colo. June 25, 2013) (allowing a biomechanical engineer to testify regarding
accident reconstruction and the effects a pre-existing spinal condition might
have on the plaintiff’s bodily movement during the accident, but not regarding
the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries); Granville v. Howard, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0133,
2012 WL 504197, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012) (stating that a
biomechanical engineer “was not required to opine whether Granville was
actually injured in order to assist the jury”); Schneider v. Chickadel, No.
02-1590-MPT, 2003 WL 21542318, at *1 n.2 (D. Del. July 8, 2003) (finding a
biomechanical engineer’s testimony “relevant only to the biomechanics of the
accident”).
288. Mason v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 588, 601 (Md. 2005).
289. Id.
290. For example, in Mrs. Crandall’s case, medical literature stated that
injury to the carotid artery could be caused by slight trauma or may occur
spontaneously. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xvi–xix.
291. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting the need for general
causation evidence in some cases where the mechanisms of injury are complex).
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general or hypothetical causation opinions irrelevant and
unhelpful, 292 misleading, 293 or even inappropriate attempts to
bootstrap specific causation opinions. 294 General causation
opinions run the risk of confusing the issues “by shifting the fact
finders’ attention from the particular to the universal.” 295 General
injury causation opinions, “while interesting, [are] irrelevant”
because opinions based on biomechanical risk curves do not show
whether or to what degree the plaintiff was in fact injured. 296
This is especially true when the plaintiff has pre-existing
conditions or a special susceptibility to injury. 297
Other courts have found general causation opinions relevant
and helpful, 298 at least when the plaintiff has no special
susceptibility to injury and is therefore more comparable to
292. See Boyd v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-108-TLS, 2011 WL 854350,
at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2011) (“[T]he Defendant’s presentation of Elaine Serina,
a biomechanical ergonomics expert, is not helpful to the Court because her
testimony only concerns whole body vibrations generally and not the specific
injury and causation allegations in this case.”).
293. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (finding it
within the trial court’s discretion to exclude two biomechanical engineers’
opinions based in part on a finding that they would mislead the jury).
294. See Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32, 38 (Del. 2004) (stating that “[i]t would
have been inappropriate and unhelpful, we think, for the biomechanical expert’s
views about the effects of forces of impact upon people generally to be used as a
basis to bootstrap a more particularized opinion” regarding the plaintiff’s spine);
Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 764 (Wash. App. 2012) (affirming a trial
court’s exclusion of biomechanical engineering testimony as unhelpful where the
expert claimed to give general causation opinions, but where “his clear message
was that Stedman could not have been injured in the accident because the force
of the impact was too small”).
295. Mason, 89 A.3d at 37.
296. See Stedman, 292 P.3d at 768 (noting another trial court’s exclusion of
general causation opinions as irrelevant, and merely attempts to draw an
inference to specific causation); Schultz, 13 P.3d at 851 (“The court assessed the
usefulness of presenting a probability theory to the jury, and concluded that
such testimony would be confusing and misleading to the jury.”).
297. See Mason, 89 A.3d at 35 (reasoning that biomechanical opinions
applying “activities of daily living” studies “would have resulted in juror
speculation, confusion and unfair prejudice to Plaintiff” because the studies
“were based on studies of normal spines”).
298. See Ma’Ele v. Arrington, 45 P.3d 557, 560 (Wash. App. 2002) (“Dr.
Tencer, a biomechanical engineer, testified that a crash like this one generally
does not cause injuries. Tencer has extensively studied low-speed
collisions . . . . The jury was entitled to believe Tencer over any of the other
witnesses.”).
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subjects in the biomechanical literature. 299 The broad discretion
given to trial courts on this issue leaves room for disagreement
about the helpfulness of biomechanical experts’ causation
opinions based on the unique circumstances of each case. 300
VII. The Role of Biomechanical Expert Testimony in Court
This Part proposes the scope of biomechanical expert
testimony that should be admissible in typical personal injury
litigation. It offers a roadmap for the application of Daubert in
courts adopting either the Smelser or Eskin approach to
biomechanical expert testimony.
First, where this is an issue of first impression, courts should
adopt Smelser’s distinction between general and specific
causation when considering the scope of biomechanical
expertise. 301 This is appropriate because the field of
biomechanics, like the fields of epidemiology and toxicology, is
concerned with causality in populations. 302 Unless a
biomechanical engineer has medical expertise, courts should limit
biomechanical expert testimony to general causation opinions
because biomechanical engineers do not possess the expertise to
make individual assessments or adapt generalized data to unique
individuals. 303
General causation opinions include testimony that relates
estimated forces of an accident to an injury threshold to show
whether population-based evidence suggests a heightened risk of
299. See Mason, 89 A.3d at 36 (noting in dicta that when a plaintiff is within
a normal range, “no rational 403 analysis would likely result in a conclusion
that the jury would be misled or confused”).
300. See Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. App. 2012) (“The
broad standard of abuse of discretion means that courts can reasonably reach
different conclusions about whether, and to what extent, an expert’s testimony
will be helpful to the jury in a particular case.”).
301. See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text (discussing the
reasons supporting the Smelser approach to limiting biomechanical expert
qualifications).
302. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (comparing the goals of
experts in the fields of toxicology and biomechanics).
303. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (collecting cases
requiring medical expertise to offer specific causation opinions).
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injury. 304 Specific causation opinions, on the other hand, focus on
the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury and whether the
injury was or was not caused by the collision. 305
In the event that a court adheres to the Eskin approach, a
judge acting as gatekeeper should exclude opinions that concern
the precise cause of a specific injury under Daubert’s reliability
prong. 306 Courts should consider the reliability of biomechanical
analysis as three separate methodologies: (1) accident
reconstruction; (2) computer simulation; and (3) extrapolation of
population-based biomechanical studies to the facts of the case.
The third step of this analysis is the most problematic, and it
does not provide a reliable basis for reaching specific injury
causation opinions because considerations such as testability,
peer review, rate of error, and general acceptance weigh against
the admissibility of these opinions. 307
Next, general causation opinions that are most likely to fall
within biomechanical expertise and to be reliable fall into two
main categories: opinions regarding which of two competing
traumatic mechanisms was more likely to cause a plaintiff’s
injury and opinions that the plaintiff’s injury is consistent with
injury mechanisms that have been observed to increase the risk
of injury in populations. 308
Courts should be wary of opinions claiming that causation is
implausible based on “activities of daily living,” mechanisms of
injury, or other biomechanical studies. 309 Methodological
weaknesses of “activities of daily living” studies make reliable
extrapolations from these studies doubtful. 310 Current
304. See supra notes 110–122 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction between general and specific causation).
305. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction between general and specific causation).
306. See supra Part V.C (applying Daubert’s reliability prong to
biomechanical experts’ methodologies and arguing that reliability
considerations weigh against the admission of specific causation opinions based
on forensic biomechanical methods).
307. See supra Part V.C (same).
308. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction between general and specific causation).
309. See supra Part V.C.iii (discussing the inability of current biomechanical
literature to rule out causation in most cases).
310. See supra notes 272–281 and accompanying text (discussing the
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biomechanical literature regarding a “no effect” threshold is
insufficient to rule out causation as a matter of law, with a few
narrow exceptions. 311
Finally, general causation opinions may not be relevant in
personal injury cases where the issue in dispute is the existence
or severity of injury. 312 The likelihood that general causation
opinions are irrelevant, confusing, misleading, or unfairly
prejudicial is greatest when the plaintiff has a special
susceptibility to injury or is otherwise unlike the test subjects of
biomechanical studies. 313
VIII. Conclusion
Over the past two decades, attorneys have retained
biomechanical engineer experts in personal injury litigation with
increasing frequency. Courts have disagreed about the scope of
biomechanical expert opinions that are admissible under
Daubert. This Note critically evaluates the application of the
Daubert standard to biomechanical expert qualifications and
methodologies. Biomechanical expert opinions are most likely to
satisfy Daubert when addressing general aspects of causation.
General causation opinions, however, are not always relevant or
helpful in personal injury litigation. Therefore, this Note
recommends a limited role for biomechanical experts in
establishing or refuting injury causation.

methodological weaknesses of studies supporting the “activities of daily living”
threshold).
311. See supra Part V.C.iii (arguing that current biomechanical literature
should only be sufficient to defeat claims of causation as a matter of law when
the plaintiff’s theory contradicts an incontrovertible biologic principle).
312. See Part VI (discussing the relevance of general causation opinions in
personal injury cases).
313. See supra notes 292–297 (collecting cases that have excluded general
causation opinions due to a risk of misleading or confusing the jury or because of
unfair prejudice).

